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RETURN TO SENDER: OFF-CAMPUS
STUDENT SPEECH BROUGHT ON-CAMPUS
BY ANOTHER STUDENT
TRACY

L. ADAMOVICHt

INTRODUCTION

The right to speak one's mind and express one's ideas is an
essential component of American society. This right is secured
and protected by the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.1
Each year a high number of alleged First
Amendment violations come before the courts. 2 These present
particularly difficult legal questions because courts must
consider the speech's impact on impressionable youth. It is not
startling that many courts continue to struggle with how far this
constitutional right should extend within our public school
system. 3 This concern presents even more difficulty for courts,
and similarly, school administrators, where the speech occurs offcampus 4 and is subsequently brought on-campus by a student
other than the original speaker. In this situation, a court must
t J.D. Candidate, 2009, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 2001, United
States Military Academy at West Point.
I See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."). This right was
incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect against possible
impairment of free speech rights by the states. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925).
2 See infra note 5 and accompanying text.
3 See Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights?
Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 54-59 (1996)
(discussing the extent of constitutional rights within schools); Andrew D.M. Miller,
Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 625-26
(2002).
4 This includes speech that is made after school hours and not on school
property.
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determine when a student's First Amendment right to engage in
off-campus private speech should yield to the school's interest in
disciplining the student for such speech.
The courts have provided little guidance on how to deal with
this situation, despite the fact that in recent years there has been
an abundance of cases regarding students and their First
Amendment rights with respect to off-campus speech. 5 In turn,
there is a plethora of scholarly literature regarding a student's
First Amendment rights to free speech.6 There is, however, little
scholarly discussion about off-campus speech that is brought on
campus or to the attention of school authorities by another
student that results in the speaker's expulsion or suspension.
This issue is likely to become more important as students
7
continue to use technology to communicate.
The four courts that have approached this issue have
treaded lightly, due to little precedent and little agreement
regarding just how far First Amendment protection should
5 See generally Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (student suspended
for unfurling a drug-endorsing banner at an off-campus, school-sponsored event);
Latour v. Riverside Beaver Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A. 05-1076, 2005 WL 2106562 (W.D.
Pa. Aug. 24, 2005) (student suspended and expelled for rap songs written and
recorded in his home); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779
(E.D. Mich. 2002) (student suspended for website likely created at home); Emmett v.
Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (student suspended
for website created at home); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d
847 (Pa. 2002) (student expelled for website created at home).
6 See generally David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship of Student Internet Speech: The
Effect of Diminishing Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000
MICH. ST. L. REV. 199 (2000) (discussing off-campus speech and school
administrators' fears about the Internet's effect on students); Rita J. Verga, Policing
Their Space: The First Amendment Parameters of School Discipline of Student
Cyberspeech, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 727 (2007) (discussing
the "First Amendment parameters of student cyberspeech."); Renee L. Servance,
Comment, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment,and the Conflict Between Schools and
the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213 (2003) (discussing bullying and offcampus speech).
7 Many of the off-campus student speech cases discussed in this Note concern
the Internet. This is not surprising, considering that 71.1% of the population of
North America uses the Internet. MINIWATTS MKTG. GROUP, INTERNET USAGE
STATISTICS (2007), http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. Thus, such offcampus issues are likely to arise with increasing frequency in response to the
widespread use of this medium.
Another possibility is that the courts will eventually entertain a lawsuit
regarding text messaging. Texting involves sending a message in textual form,
usually by a cellular phone or other similar device. Because of its increasing
popularity among school-age children, it is yet another medium by which one could
foresee future litigation regarding students' First Amendment rights.
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extend.8 The line delineating fully protected off-campus speech
from the less protected on-campus speech becomes especially
unclear when the off-campus speech is subsequently brought oncampus without the knowledge or permission of the speaker. 9
This distinction between on and off-campus speech is essential
because it is often the threshold question in determining the
applicable standard. 10
If the speech is made on-campus, it usually fits into one of
the three common categories: speech that is excessively lewd and
vulgar; school-sponsored speech; or other speech such as political,
religious, or moral opinions and statements. If a school considers
the speech to be excessively lewd and vulgar, it may prohibit that
speech. 1 Likewise, if the speech arises in the context of a schoolsponsored activity, the school is justified in "exercising editorial
control.., so long as [its] actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns."'12
In other on-campus
situations, a school may prohibit a student's speech only if it has
reason to believe the speech will "materially disrupt[] classwork
or involve[] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others."13
By contrast, when speech originates off-campus and is
brought on-campus by a student other than the original speaker,
the analysis is more difficult. Two courts have applied the
"material and substantial" disruption test 4 in order to determine
if the student's rights were violated, but have lacked uniformity
8 See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 1741 (2008); Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619-20 (5th
Cir. 2004); Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 627 (8th Cir.
2002) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (arguing it was protected speech and that the court
should have considered the fact that the speech took place off-campus); Killion v.
Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454 (W.D. Pa. 2001); see also infra
Part II.
9 See Porter, 393 F.3d at 619; Richard Salgado, Comment, Protecting Student
Speech Rights While Increasing School Safety: School Jurisdictionand the Search
for Warning Signs in a Post-Columbine/Red Lake Environment, 2005 BYU L. REV.
1371, 1374 (2005).
10 See Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 864-65.
11See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
12 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
13 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
14 See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008) (using Tinker to analyze an Instant Message
transmission which occurred off-campus); Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F.
Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) ("The overwhelming weight of authority has
analyzed student speech (whether on or off campus) in accordance with Tinker.").
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in their application of that test. Another court held that because
the speech was off-campus it was fully protected, thus ignoring
the fact that it actually reached campus. 15 One other court
analyzed the speech as a "true threat," while the dissent argued
that a "substantial and material" disruption test should have
16
been the appropriate analysis.
This Note will address these apparent inconsistencies and
recommend a solution for courts when analyzing such free speech
Part I of this Note discusses the history of First
cases.
Amendment student speech jurisprudence. Part II provides an
in-depth analysis of the four cases that concern off-campus
speech brought on-campus by third parties. Part III compares
student speech with public employee speech and asserts that an
applicable standard can be developed by comparing these two
areas of law. This Note concludes by recommending that a
balancing test be applied much like that utilized in public
employee First Amendment claims, and advocating its use when
a student's private conversation is brought on campus by another
student.
I.

A.

THE EVOLUTION OF STUDENT SPEECH CASE LAW

FoundationalCases Regarding On-Campus Speech

The "Substantial and Material" Disruption Test
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District17 is often at the heart of any discussion regarding a
In Tinker, several
student's right to freedom of speech.18
students decided to wear black armbands to school in opposition
to the war in Vietnam. 19 When school authorities became aware
of this plan, they adopted a policy that any student wearing an
armband would be told to remove it, and if he or she refused, that
1.

15 See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619-20 (5th Cir. 2004)
(discussing other courts' use of the substantial disruption test, but choosing not to
apply it because the speech originated off-campus).
16 Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 621-22, 627 (8th Cir.
2002). A "true threat" is where the "speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual." Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); see also infra Part III.D.
17 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
18 See Miller, supra note 3, at 628.
19 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
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student would be suspended until returning without one. 20
Consequently, several students sued the school after they
21
were suspended for wearing an armband on campus.
As Justice Fortas stated, "[i]t can hardly be argued
that... students... shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 22 The Court
held that the school violated the First Amendment rights of its
students when it failed to demonstrate that it "had reason to
anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially
interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights
23
of other students."
The Court in Tinker also discussed the prohibition of
viewpoint discrimination, stating that "school officials cannot
suppress 'expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to
contend.' "24 A school administrator cannot prohibit expression of
a particular opinion unless it can show "something more than a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."25 Hence, political
speech and other such potentially controversial speech are
protected by Tinker.
2.

Speech That Is "Obscene," "Vulgar," "Lewd," and
"Offensively Lewd"

Nearly twenty years later, the Supreme Court decided Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser.26 In Bethel, the Court held that
a school was justified in punishing a student who gave a speech
that referred to a candidate for school office in terms of an
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.

at 506. This statement is quite popular and is often quoted in cases and
writings. See, e.g., Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 468 (6th Cir.
2000); Barber ex rel. Barber v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., 286 F. Supp. 2d 847, 852 (E.D.
Mich. 2003); Dupre, supra note 3, at 54.
23 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. Throughout this Note, this test is referred to
interchangeably as the Tinker analysis or the "substantial and material disruption"
test.
24 Id. at 511 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). "The
classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, (rather)than through any kind of
authoritative selection.'" Id. at 512 (emphasis added) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
25 Id. at 509.
26 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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"elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor." 27 Matthew
Fraser ("Fraser") gave his speech at an assembly where many
students were required to attend. The Court labeled Fraser's
remarks as "vulgar," "indecent," "sexually explicit," and
"offensively lewd. ' 28
The Court reasoned, "[i]t does not
follow.., that simply because the use of an offensive form of
expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the
speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be
permitted to children in a public school." 29 Further stressing the
point, the Court opined that "the constitutional rights of students
in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights
of adults in other settings. ' 30 The Court concluded that a school
may prohibit speech that is vulgar, lewd, and offensive. 3 1
With this holding, the Court effectively narrowed a student's
right to free speech in the school setting. After Tinker and
Bethel, there was a shift toward increasing school authority and
lessening judicial interference. 32 The Bethel Court impacted the
authority of school officials by allowing them to decide what type
of speech is permissible for students in public schools. The end
result was the return of some authority to school officials in
deciding what type of speech is permissible by students in public
schools. 33 Through Bethel, the Court effectively shifted the focus
of student expression from the rights of the students to the needs
of the educators and administrators, and showed an almost total
judicial deference to the schools to pursue a safe and educational
Id. at 678. Fraser gave the following speech:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt,
his character is firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of
Bethel is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary,
he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in
spurts-he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and
every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you
and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
28 Id. at 685 (majority opinion).
29 Id. at 682.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 685.
32 See Miller, supra note 3, at 637-40 (noting the shift in favor of school
authority regarding students' rights after Tinker).
27

33 Id.
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environment. 34 The Court continued this trend in Hazelwood
35
School District v. Kuhlmeier.
3.

Legitimate Pedagogical Need
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,3 6 the Court
addressed a case in which the school principal deleted two pages
from a school newspaper that he believed violated the privacy of
several students. 37 One article profiled pregnant students, and
the other profiled children of divorced parents.3 8 The Court
permitted the principal's deletion, holding that if the speech at
issue is "school-sponsored" a school may censor the speech "so
long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns." 39
Thus, the Court granted school
authorities the power to curtail and even censure speech that is
part of the school curriculum. "This includes authority 'over
school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other
expressive activities ... reasonably perceive[d] to bear the
imprimatur of the school.' "40 In order to reach this conclusion,
"[tihe Court reasoned that there is a fundamental distinction
between school officials' toleration of student speech and school
officials' affirmative promotion of student speech." 41 Included in
this latter category is speech that is part of the school
42
curriculum.

34 See Dupre, supra note 3, at 83-86 (stating that the Supreme Court's decisions
in Fraser and Hazelwood indicate a return of authority to school officials in
regulating student expression in the school setting); Miller, supra note 3, at 636-37
(arguing that Fraser and Hazelwood can be seen as "the beginning of the end" for
public school students free speech because in both cases the Court focused on
school's power and ability to regulate student speech).

35 484 U.S. 260 (1988).

Id.
Id. at 262-64. The principal, after reading the page proofs, believed there was
no time to make changes to the stories, and decided to publish the newspaper
without them, deleting the two pages that contained the offending stories. Id. at
263-64.
38 Id. at 263.
36
37

39 Id. at 273.
40 Martin A. Schwartz, Supreme Court Restricts Student Speech, N.Y. L.J., Oct.
16, 2007, at 3 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71).
41 Id.
42 Id.
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The Need to Prohibit Illegal Drug Use

4.

More recently, in Morse v. Frederick,43 the Court held that a
school was justified in confiscating a banner in which a student
proclaimed, "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS." 44 The student holding the
banner was attending an off-campus, school-sponsored event in
January 2002, as the Olympic Torch Relay passed through
Juneau, Alaska. 45 The school principal had allowed students to
leave class in order to observe the event as "as an approved social
Frederick strategically unfurled the
event or class trip."46
47
controversial banner just as the camera crews passed him by.
The Court opined that "schools may take steps to safeguard
those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be
regarded as encouraging illegal drug use." 48 This case potentially
opens the door for school administrators to further restrict the
First Amendment rights of students.
This case differs from the trilogy of earlier cases in that it
involves off-campus speech. The Court, however, treated the
event as school-sponsored, making it still suitable to on-campus
classification. Nonetheless, Morse illustrates the blurred line
between on-campus and off-campus speech.
Off-Campus Speech

B.

The extent of a student's First Amendment rights regarding
off-campus speech is still developing, and a consistent pattern
has not yet materialized. This is likely due to multiple factors:
first, few such school cases have been litigated; second, although
the seminal Supreme Court cases regarding student speech
provide the courts with time-tested standards available to them
if the speech is on-campus, they provide little direct guidance on
49
how to analyze an off-campus situation.
43 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). For a blog entry discussing Morse, see Mitchell H.
Rubinstein, Supreme Court Rejects First Amendment Defense of Student Who
Displayed Banner Promoting Illegal Drug Use, ADJUNCT LAW PROF BLOG, June 25,

2007, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/2007/06/supreme-court-h.html.
44 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
45
46
47
48

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

49 See infra Part I.A. The only exception is in Bethel School District Number 403
v. Fraser,where Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion states, "[i]f respondent
had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been
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Some courts have simply analyzed off-campus speech cases
by declining to differentiate between student speech occurring on
or off-campus.
In doing so, they have applied the Tinker
"material and substantive" disruption standard when analyzing
off-campus speech brought onto the school campus. 50 Other
courts, however, have found that even if the off-campus speech
makes its way on-campus, it is entitled to full First Amendment
Yet another court combined the approaches,
protection. 51
analyzing off-campus speech "under a flurry of standards.., to
52
comprehensively address all possible legal approaches."
The confusion caused by these inconsistencies multiplies
where the speech reaches campus through another student. In
such cases, the student-speaker is even farther removed from the
school setting.
II. OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH BROUGHT ON-CAMPUS BY THIRD
PARTIES

Given that the pure off-campus speech law is in disarray, it
is not surprising that a consistent pattern is lacking with respect
to off-campus speech brought on-campus by another student.
penalized simply because government officials considered his language to be
inappropriate." 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
50 Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (5th Cir. 2004);
see, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007)
(applying Tinker to a website created off-campus); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v.
Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (applying Tinker to a website
created off-campus); Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455
(W.D. Pa. 2001) (applying Tinker to a student who compiled a list while off-campus);
Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000)
(applying Tinker to mock obituary website created off-campus); CHARLES J. RUSSO &
RALPH D. MAWDSLEY, EDUCATION LAW § 4.07[7] (2007 ed.) (stating that students
may engage in indecent or malicious off-campus speech if "it does not actually cause
school disruption").
51 Porter,393 F.3d at 619 & n.43 (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043,
1050 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[B]ecause school officials ventured out... into the general
community where the freedom accorded expression is at its zenith, their actions
must be evaluated by the principles that bind government officials in the public
arena.")).
52 Id. at 619 & n.44 (citing Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 783-86 (analyzing a
website created off-campus under Tinker and the true threat analysis while citing to
Thomas for the proposition that school officials have diminished authority regarding
student off-campus expression)). The court opined that commentators are frustrated
at these inconsistencies and "have begun calling for courts to more clearly delineate
the boundary line between off-campus speech entitled to greater First Amendment
protection, and on-campus speech subject to greater regulation." Id. at 619-20.
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These cases involve student speech that occurred outside of
school grounds and after school hours. The speech was later
brought to the attention of school authorities by another student,
and the student-speaker was ultimately disciplined. Although
the specific underlying facts differ between the cases, they all
have a common thread-the student neither intended nor desired
his speech to reach school grounds.
In two of the following cases, the deciding court relied on the
Tinker "substantial and material disruption" test. 53 These two
courts varied in their application of the test, however, according
different weight to the factors used to determine whether there
was a substantial or material disruption. Another court declined
to use the Tinker test because the speech occurred off-campus.
Instead, it analyzed the issue by using generally applicable First
54
Amendment standards, and held that the speech was protected.
In a fourth case, the court applied a "true threat" analysis,
holding that the speech was a threat and therefore wholly
unprotected. The dissent's argument that the court should have
considered the off-campus nature of the speech is particularly
well-reasoned and relevant, however.5 5 The lack of a clear
guideline, even for those supposedly using a similar standard,
produces unfairness and a lack of uniformity across jurisdictions.
A.

Wisniewski v. Board of Education

Recently, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education,56 the Second
Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the school district,
holding that a school was justified in expelling a student who
engaged in off-campus private speech. 57 Wisniewski shared with
friends, via an Instant Message, a small drawing crudely
suggesting that a certain teacher should be shot and killed.5 8
53 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008); Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
54 See Porter,393 F.3d at 620.
55 See Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 636 (8th Cir.
2002).
56 494 F.3d 34.
57 Id. at 35; see also Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Icon Depicting Shooting of Teacher
Not Protected Speech as It Was Foreseeable to Cause School Disruption, ADJUNCT
LAW PROF BLOG, July 12, 2007, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/
2007/07/icon-depicting-.html (commenting on Pulaski).
58 Instant messaging allows a person with Internet access to exchange messages
in real time with members of a group who have similar software on their computers.
Members of this group are usually called "buddies" and are said to belong to a
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Wisniewski did not send this message from school grounds, but
instead from his parents' home computer. 59 Another student,
upon becoming aware of the Instant Message icon, alerted the
named teacher to the existence of the picture and eventually
showed him a copy of it.60 In holding that the school was justified
in punishing Wisniewski, the court reasoned there was a
reasonably foreseeable risk that Wisniewski's drawing would
come to the attention of school authorities and ultimately would
materially and substantially disrupt work and discipline at the
school. 6 1 The court felt it was irrelevant that Wisniewski created
and transmitted the Instant Message away from school property,
and reasoned that it is possible to cause disruption even when
outside school grounds. 62 Yet, in so holding, it ignored the fact
that there was no evidence indicating that Wisniewski intended
to disrupt school activities, or that he desired the speech to
actually reach campus.
B. Killion v. FranklinRegional School District
In Killion v. Franklin Regional School District,63 high- school
student Zachariah Paul and his mother brought an action
against the school alleging violations of his First Amendment
64
rights. The school suspended Paul for writing a list of insults
"buddy

list." Instant message enables rapid exchanges of text between any two
members of a "buddy list" that are online at the same time. Such speech is not

available for the public to view, but instead may only be viewed by the member or
members of the "buddy list" to whom the speaker is addressing. Wisniewski, 494
F.3d at 35.
59 Id.

60 Id. at 36.

Id. at 38-39.
Id. at 39 (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir.
1979) ("Ve can, of course, envision a case in which a group of students incites
substantial disruption within the school from some remote locale.")).
63 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
64 The court provided the text of the list:
10) The School Store doesn't sell twink[i]es.
9) He is constantly tripping over his own chins.
8) The girls at the 900#'s keep hanging up on him.
7) For him, becoming Franklin's "Athletic Director" was considered "moving
up in the world".
6) He has to use a pencil to type and make phone calls because his fingers
are unable to hit only one key at a time.
5) As stated in previous list, he's just not getting any.
4) He is no longer allowed in any "All You Can Eat" restaurants.
3) He has constant flashbacks of when he was in high school and the
61
62
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about the school's athletic director, which he composed at home
and after school hours. 65 An unknown third party subsequently
brought the writing to school and placed it in the teacher's
66
lounge, where it was later discovered by several individuals.
The court held that the student's document did not disrupt school
or interfere with other students' substantial rights, and granted
67
summary judgment for the plaintiffs.
In reaching this conclusion, the court adopted the Tinker
standard. The court held that the student's speech did not
disrupt school or interfere with anyone's substantive rights, and
it could not "ignore the fact that the relevant speech.., occurred
within the confines of Paul's home, far removed from any school
premises or facilities." 68 It reasoned that the speech was not
threatening, and although it upset the named teacher, there was
no evidence that other teachers were incapable of teaching or
controlling their classes. 69 In fact, Paul did not print the list or
bring it on school premises; he only e-mailed the list to some
friends. 70 Several weeks passed before the list appeared in the
teacher's lounge at the Franklin Regional High School, and the
list was on campus for several days before the administration
even became aware of it and took action. 7 1
C.

Porter v. Ascension ParishSchool Board
In Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board,72 a school
punished a student for a private expression which was brought
on-campus by a third party. Adam Porter brought an action
against his high school principal and other administrators
alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights after he was
removed from school for a sketch of a violent siege of the school
athletes used to pick on him, instead of him picking on the athletes.
2) Because of his extensive gut factor, the "man" hasn't seen his own penis
in over a decade.
1) Even it is [sic] wasn't for his gut, it would still take a magnifying glass
and extensive searching to find it.
Id. at 448 n.1.
65 Id. at 448.
66 Id. at 448-49.
67 See id. at 455.
68 Id. at 457.
69 See id. at 455.
70
71
72

See id. at 457.
Id. at 448-49.
393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004).
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that he had drawn two years prior. 73 The court held that the
sketch was protected speech. 74 Ironically, the court nonetheless
granted summary judgment in favor of the principal, dismissing
the First Amendment claim, declaring that the principal had
qualified immunity because the existing law failed to provide
75
clear guidance on the constitutionality of his actions.
Like the students in Wisniewski and Killion, Porter was
disciplined for off-campus speech. In the privacy of his own
home, Porter had sketched a crude drawing of his school, East
Ascension High School. 76 The drawing depicted the school under
attack from a gasoline tanker truck, a missile launcher,
helicopter, and armed persons. 77 "The sketch also contained
obscenities and racial epithets."78 Porter showed the sketch to
his mother, his younger brother, and a friend who was living
with the family, and then stored the sketchpad in a closet. 79 Two
years later, Porter's younger brother, Andrew Breen, went
80
searching for something to draw on and found the notebook.
Breen drew a llama on a blank page and brought it to school to
show his teacher.8 1 On the way home from school, he showed his
picture to a friend.8 2 The friend, while flipping through the
notebook, saw Porter's picture, and alerted the bus driver, who
then showed the drawing to the school principal.8 3 Shortly
thereafter, Porter was recommended for expulsion and arrested

73 Porter also alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment and Due Process
rights. Id. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants for both
allegations. Id.
74 Id. at 620.
75 Id. at 621. The court allowed the principal qualified immunity because it felt
that a principal should not be punished in a situation where
a reasonable school official facing this question for the first time would find
no 'pre-existing' body of law from which he could draw clear guidance and
certain conclusions. Rather, a reasonable school official would encounter a
body of case law sending inconsistent signals as to how far school authority
to regulate student speech reaches beyond the confines of the campus.
Id. at 620. It further opined that punishing a principal in this situation would lead
to intimidation, instead of fearless decision-making. See id. at 621.
76 Id. at 611.

77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82

Id.

83 Id.
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for "terrorizing" the school.8 4 The court held that the speech did
not equate to on-campus speech.8 5 It reasoned that the Tinker
standard was inappropriate because the drawing was composed
off-campus and remained off-campus for two years until it was
taken to school by Porter's younger brother.8 6 The court further
reasoned that there was no evidence to prove that he directed his
speech toward the school campus. Thus, it held that the speech
87
was fully protected.
D. Doe v. Pulaski
In Doe v. Pulaski,8 8 a junior high student, J.M., drafted two
letters to his former girlfriend, K.G., also a student, expressing a
desire to assault and murder her.8 9 J.M.'s mother filed this
lawsuit on her son's behalf when he was expelled as a result of
the letters. 90 J.M. did not deliver the letters to his ex-girlfriend,
nor did he intend for her to see them. 9 1 Months after J.M.
penned the letters, his best friend discovered them, stole one, and
delivered it to K.G., which resulted in school authorities being
notified of the threats. 92 The court held that the letters were
"true threat[s]," that they were not entitled to First Amendment
protection, and that the expulsion was reasonable. 93 In order to
reach this decision, the Circuit Court opined that it was
necessary to conclude that J.M. intended to communicate the
letter and that a reasonable recipient would have viewed the
letter as a threat. 94 It ultimately held that J.M. did, in fact,
intend for the content of the letters to be communicated when he
permitted his friend to read the letter. 95 Moreover, the court held
that a reasonable person would perceive the letters as a threat
because of the disturbing language used throughout the letter,

84
85

86
87
88

89

90

Id. at 612.
Id. at 615.
Id.
See id. at 617-18.
306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 619.
Id. at 620.

91 Id. at 619-20.
92

Id.

93 Id. at 626-27.
94
95

Id. at 624.
Id. at 624-25.
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and because of J.M.'s portrayal of himself as a "tough guy with a
96
propensity for aggression."
Although the majority decided the case using a "true threat"
analysis, Judge McMillian, in his dissent, argued that the speech
was protected because it was not a "true threat," and was made
off-campus, in the privacy of J.M.'s home. 97 He questioned
"whether the school had any legitimate authority over such a
statement, made in the privacy of his home, not at school or
during school hours .... which was stolen from his home by one
98
of his friends,... and then turned over to school officials."
Judge McMillian implicitly recognized the necessity of
distinguishing private off-campus speech from speech that occurs
on school grounds, and the propriety of affording the former with
greater First Amendment protection.
E.

Analysis of the Leading Cases ConcerningOff-Campus
Speech Brought on Campus by a Third Party

In the preceding four cases, the courts grappled with the
standard to apply to determine the extent of the student's rights.
For example, the courts in Killion and Wisniewski considered
whether the student's speech substantially and materially
disrupted school activities. They differed, however, in the degree
of weight afforded to external factors, such as where the speech
was made, when it was made, and how the speech reached
campus. The Wisniewski court stated that speech occurring off of
school property is not necessarily insulated from school
discipline. 99 Yet, in Killion, the court gave considerable weight to
the fact that the speech occurred off-campus. 100
In Porter the court grappled with whether it should apply
the "substantial and material disruption" test, but decided
against it. The court ultimately based its decision on the basic

96 Id. at 625-26.
97 Id. at 636 (McMillian, J., dissenting). In addition to Judge McMillian, several
other judges argued in the dissent that J.M.'s letter was protected speech that could
only be "reasonably regulated by school administrators to prevent substantial
disruption in the school setting." Id. at 627 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 636 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
99 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 1741 (2008).
100 See Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 457 (W.D. Pa.
2001).
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premise that "[p]rivate writings made and kept in one's home
enjoy the protection of the First Amendment." 10 1
Although the majority in the Pulaski court considered J.M.'s
speech a "true threat," and thus considered his speech
unprotected, Judge McMillian agreed with the other dissenters
that a substantial and material disruption test should be
applied.102 He further argued that in making the determination
of whether there was such a disruption, the fact that the student
did not personally bring the letter on campus should be
considered. 10 3 Thus, the dissent's standard is quite similar to the
application of the substantial and material disruption test used
in Killion, because of the emphasis on the fact that the speech
occurred off-campus.
Thus, with respect to off-campus speech brought on campus
by another student, we are left with several different standards.
Because of these inconsistencies, a court, or even a school official,
facing this dilemma cannot find pre-existing law from which it
10 4
could "draw clear guidance and certain conclusions."'
Accordingly, it is necessary to establish a clear standard that
could be readily and easily applied in order to give such guidance.
In order to accomplish this task, it is helpful to look to other
areas of law.

III. REACHING A SOLUTION: APPLYING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH
STANDARDS TO STUDENT SPEECH CASES

A.

Analogy to Public Employee Speech

To establish a workable standard for protecting off-campus
speech, courts should analogize to some of the standards
applicable to public employee free speech. The public employee
standard has already been applied to some extent within the
school setting. In Lowery v. Euverard,0 5 for example, the Sixth
06
Circuit compared student athletes to government employees.
101 Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 617 (5th Cir. 2004).
See Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 627 (McMillian, J., dissenting).

102

103

See id.

Porter, 393 F.3d at 620.
105 497 F.3d 584, (6th Cir. 2007).
106 Id. at 596-97 ("Somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a 'closely
regulated industry,' students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have
104
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The court discussed the distinction between programs that are
voluntarily participated in, such as extracurricular activities, and
those activities that are regulated as a matter of law, such
as attending school. 10 7
The court reasoned that because
of the voluntary nature of extracurricular
activities,
"greater restrictions on student athletes are analogous to
the greater restrictions on government employees," making
the "legal principles from the government employment
context ...relevant" in the student athlete context.108 There are
several other similarities and distinctions between public
employee speech and student speech. The first similarity is that
a school is a creature of the government itself. Courts have held
in student speech cases and public employee free speech cases
that "a government entity has broader discretion to restrict
speech." 10 9 Likwise, courts have held that both school authorities
and governmental employers must maintain some "control over
their [students' and] employees' words and actions"'110 in order to
operate efficiently. Further, the relationship between students
and teachers is similar to the relationship between employees
and supervisors. A student is under certain constraints during
the school day, just as an employee is during the work day.
reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy."
(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995))). In Lowery, the
four plaintiffs were student-members of the Jefferson County High School football
team. Id. at 585. Defendant Euverard became the lead varsity coach in 2004. Id.
During the 2005 season, many players became dissatisfied with Euverard as the
coach. Id. In October of 2005, one plaintiff typed the following statement: "I hate
Coach Euvard [sic] and I don't want to play for him." Id. Two of the plaintiffs asked
the other team members to sign the petition. Id. The plaintiffs intended to give the
petition to the principal of the school. Id. Euverard learned of the petition shortly
thereafter. See id. at 586. The plaintiffs were uncooperative when asked about the
petition and were eventually told they could no longer play for the team. See id. The
players who signed the petition, but apologized for doing so, were allowed to remain
on the team. Id.
107 See id. at 597 ("Restrictions that would be inappropriate for the student body
at large may be appropriate in the context of voluntary athletic programs.").
108 Id. In contrast, in Pinard v. Clatskanie School District 6J, the Ninth Circuit
reversed a ruling by the district court that analogized student athletes as public
employees, and held that the "proper First Amendment framework for student
speech cases is set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in Tinker and its progeny."
467 F.3d 755, 765 (9th Cir. 2006).
109 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006); see also Pickering v. Bd.of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (recognizing that the government's interests as an
employer in regulating the speech of its employees "differ significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general").
110 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1958.
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There is a need for orderly decorum in order to get work and
school work done. Thus, the student and the employee both have
responsibilities, and rules and regulations they must follow.
Nonetheless, there are also some notable differences. The
first difference is that a student is required to attend school
everyday. An employee, on the other hand, voluntarily chooses to
work as a public employee. This is a subtle difference, however,
because most employees have to work to earn a living, and
because once an employee chooses to work for the government, he
or she must attend regularly, just as a student must regularly
attend class.
A second difference is the age of those concerned. The
students are at a younger, more impressionable age.
Furthermore, they are more susceptible to peer pressure and are
more affected by what their classmates are saying and doing.
Hence, the protection and the shelter they need may differ from
the protection adults require.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the similarities outweigh
the differences, and that the public employee speech cases
provide a useful model for student speech cases. In order to
further evaluate the possible application of public speech cases to
student speech cases, it is first necessary to understand when
speech is protected in the public employee First Amendment
context.
B.

Public Employee Speech

The landmark case in the government employee First
Amendment context is Pickering v. Board of Education."' In
Pickering,the Court held that the school board was not justified
in firing Marshall Pickering, a teacher."1 2 Pickering sued the
school board for violating his First Amendment rights when he
was fired shortly after writing a letter to his local newspaper in
connection with a proposed tax increase. 1 3 He criticized the way
the Board of Education and the District Superintendent of
Schools handled past proposals to raise revenue for the school
district. 1 4 Pickering was dismissed after the Board determined
that publication of the letter was "'detrimental to the efficient
111 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

See id. at 574-75.
See id. at 564-65.
114 Id. at 564.
112
13
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operation and administration of the schools of the district.' "115
The Court opined: "The problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees." 116 This has
become known as the Pickeringbalancing test. In using this test,
the Court concluded that "the interest of the school
administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to
public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in
limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general
117
public."
The Pickering balancing test is only one part of public
employee free speech jurisprudence. The other parts of public
employee speech have no applicability to student speech, but are
still useful in order to understand the bigger picture. Following
Pickering, the Court further elaborated the public concern
element in Connick v. Myers, 118 and elevated it to the level of a
threshold question in public employee First Amendment cases.
The Court held that a public employee's limited First
Amendment rights do not require the employer to tolerate action
that he reasonably believes "would disrupt the office, undermine
his authority, and destroy close working relationships."' 19 In
Connick, Sheila Myers, an Assistant District Attorney, was
notified of her impending transfer, and in response, she
Shortly
distributed a questionnaire to her colleagues. 120
thereafter, Myers was allegedly terminated for refusing to
transfer. 12 1 The Court held that the questionnaire did not meet
the "public concern" threshold, and so it never reached the
Pickeringbalancing test. 122
Although useful in the public employee context, the "public
concern" element should not be used in student First Amendment
115Id.
116 Id. at 568; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (explaining
the requirement that the speech be a matter of "legitimate public concern" in order
to be protected).
117 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573.

118 461 U.S. at 142-49.
119 Id. at 154.
120
121
122

See id. at 140-41.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 148.
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speech cases. It is not practical because most, if not all, student
speech relates to private concerns. Student speech is often
restricted to private grievances against teachers, administrators,
and fellow students.
Personal "[alutonomy is one of the primary justifications
underlying freedom of speech." 123 "When school officials are
authorized only to punish speech" that occurs on-campus, "the
student is free to" express himself off-campus and after school
hours, so that society is not "deprived of the salutary effects of
expression."1 24 Using the public concern element would prove to
be too constricting, censuring the majority of such student
expression.
In regard to public employee law, there is one more element
that should be discussed-whether the employee is speaking
pursuant to his or her official duties. This element is a result of
Garcetti v. Ceballos.1 25 The Court held that an employee's speech
is not protected when it is made "pursuant to [his] official
duties," because in that situation "the employee[] [is] not
126
speaking as [a] citizen[] for First Amendment purposes."
Richard Ceballos, a supervising deputy district attorney, was
asked to review a case in which the defense counsel claimed that
police had used an incorrect affidavit to obtain a critical search
warrant.127 After concluding his review, Ceballos found the
affidavit did, in fact, make "serious misrepresentations."1 28 He
reported these discoveries to his supervisors and suggested
dismissing the case. 12 9
Nonetheless, the prosecutors went
forward with the case. Following his testimony at a hearing
challenging the warrant, Ceballos was transferred. He then
123 See Jeffrey A. Shooman, Comment, The Speech of Public Employees Outside
the Workplace: Towards a New Framework, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1341, 1360
(2006).
124 Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979).
125 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
126 Id. The Court explained:
The significant point is that the memo was written pursuant to Ceballos'
official duties. Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public
employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the
employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the
exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has
commissioned or created.
Id.
127 Id. at 1955.
128

Id.

129

Id. at 1955-56.
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alleged his employers retaliated against him and violated his
First Amendment rights. 130 The Court, however, did not find a
constitutional violation.
The holding from this case is also not applicable in student
speech cases because a student speaking at home and after
school hours is clearly not speaking in the role of being a student,
except in the rare situation where he is speaking at a schoolsponsored event. This Note is not attempting to cover that
scenario.
The Solution: Application of the PickeringBalancing Test to
Situations Where Another Student Brings the Speech to
Campus
A solution that would benefit both the schools, by allowing
them to maintain control and discipline in specified
circumstances, and the students, by allowing them to express
themselves freely in the majority of situations, would be the
adoption of a uniform balancing test, similar to that provided in
Pickering. The balancing test is particularly useful for situations
when another student brings the speech to campus because they
Moreover, a
present such a discrete set of circumstances.
balancing test is practical and is already used to some extent by
courts in student free speech cases. 13 1 It is also helpful because
instead of focusing solely on the actual or potential impact on the
school, it forces the court to consider all the circumstances
surrounding the speech. The balancing test, however, needs to
be standardized to create the uniformity that courts are currently
lacking. In addition, this will aid school administrators and
judges in determining whether censorship and/or punishment is
justified.
C.

See id. at 1956.
See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 614 (5th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that the district court developed standards "specifically to balance the
First Amendment rights of students with the special need of educators to maintain a
safe and effective learning environment"); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F.
Supp. 2d 587, 595 (W.D. Pa. 2007) ("[Tjhe Court must balance the freedom of
expression of a student with the right and responsibility of a public school to
maintain an environment conducive to learning."); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem
Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. 2002) (stating that "the high courts of both
the United States and Pennsylvania have performed the delicate balancing" when
considering student constitutional rights and "the school officials' need to
maintain.., discipline").
130
131
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When applying the balancing test, the court must not
consider the statement or expression "in a vacuum." 132 While
there is no easy formula for weighing one party's interest against
another's, there are certain factors that may guide courts in
133
performing their analyses and reaching a fair conclusion.
In determining whether the school district is justified in
disciplining a student when his off-campus speech is brought oncampus, the court should consider the following pertinent factors:
(1) the intent, if any, for the speech to reach campus; (2) the
number of listeners; (3) the nexus between the student speech
and school operations; (4) the level of disruption on the school's
134
operations caused by the speech.
The first factor considers the intent of the student at the
time of transmission.
If the child desires the speech to
eventually reach campus, then punishment is more likely
justified. Similarly, if the student expresses himself to a student
he knows may be personally and intimately involved with the
subject of the transmission, and therefore may be more likely to
share it, or to a student who has brought such speech to campus
in the past, then the student-speaker should be reasonably aware
that his listener may bring the speech to campus.
Often,
however, the student may be only expressing himself to his close
friends, or expressing his emotions privately by means of
doodling in a book or writing in a journal. The student might
have chosen to do this away from school grounds because he
realized the impropriety of doing it during school hours. The fact
that the student did not intend for his speech to be brought oncampus should be given weight as a mitigating factor.
The second important consideration is the number of
listeners. The more people the student addresses, the more
likely that the speech will reach the school and/or disrupt its
operations. Consider a situation where a student writes a letter
and puts it in his nightstand, 3 5 or draws pictures in a notebook
132 Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1207 (10th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)).
133 See id. Some of these factors are a synthesis of employee and student First
Amendment cases, while the others were developed to ensure a broad range of
considerations. Each of these factors should be considered independently, and none
should be considered dispositive.
134 These factors do not come from any specific case.
136 See Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir.
2002) (holding that a school was justified in suspending a student who wrote a letter
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and puts it in his closet. 136 There, it is much less probable that
the speech will reach school or affect anyone. In considering a
similar situation, the Circuit Court in Porterheld that "[f]or such
writings to lose their First Amendment protection, something
more than their accidental and unintentional exposure to public
scrutiny must take place."'137 Conversely, if a student sends an email to his distribution list, consisting of thirty students, there is
a very high likelihood that one of his recipients will further
spread the content. The greater the number of listeners, the less
likely any exposure will be accidental and unintentional, and the
more likely it is to reach campus by means of a third party.
Therefore, the student should be aware in a situation with a high
number of listeners that his speech is likely not to remain
In
private, and is possibly going to reach school grounds.
weighing this factor, a court should consider both the number of
listeners and the medium for transmission in order to reach a
fair decision.
The next consideration requires some recognizable nexus
between the student's speech and the operation of the school. 138
In several off-campus student First Amendment cases the courts
have already denied "the imposition of discipline by school
authorities" if they "find an insufficient nexus to school."' 139 . To
to his ex-girlfriend and hid it in his drawer).
136 See Porter, 393 F.3d at 611, 618 (holding that a school was not justified in
suspending a student who drew a picture in a notebook while in the privacy of his
own home).
137 Id. at 617-18.
138 Although differing slightly in application, whether there was a "sufficient
nexus" between the private speech and any "adverse employment action by the
employer" is occasionally an issue in public employee speech cases. Huang v. Bd. of
Governors, 902 F.2d 1134, 1140 (4th Cir. 1990) (discussing a requirement for the
employee to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the protected speech and the
adverse action). There must be some "but for" connection or adverse action is not
permitted. Id. In order to prove such a nexus, it must first be proved that there was
a nexus between the speech and the workplace, otherwise a "but for" connection
between the speech and the punishment would be extremely attenuated.
139 Ronald D. Wenkart, Discipline of K-12 Students for Conduct Off School
Grounds, 210 EDUC. L. REP. 531, 538 (2006) (discussing that the conduct must
somehow be related to school activity); see, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d
1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979) (recognizing that the student activity took place almost
exclusively after school hours and off-campus); Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462
F.2d 960, 964, 970 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that an underground newspaper that was
distributed outside of the school led to no attributable disturbances at the school);
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2007) ("[I]n
cases involving off-campus speech.., the school must demonstrate an appropriate

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

1110

[Vol. 82:1087

establish this nexus, the school must show that the speech was
specifically directed towards the school, or the school must be
able to connect the off-campus speech with potential disruption
at school.140 If the gap in this causal link is too substantial, then
there is not enough of a nexus for the school to justify its
prohibition.141 By holding a child responsible in a situation
where that connection is lacking, there is a real danger that the
student will be blamed for a disruption at school in which he took
no part. For example, there is probably more of a nexus if the
speech is concerning a teacher or administrator than if the
student is talking about another student, whom he knows
because of an after-school activity. In the latter situation,
connection between the students only occurs off school grounds
and after school hours. There is much less of a chance for this
relationship to cause any disruption on school grounds. Another
consideration here is when the speech is made in relation to
school attendance. If the speech is uttered over summer vacation
or over Easter break, there is arguably a much weaker nexus to
the school than if the speech is uttered during the school year.
The final, and perhaps most difficult, consideration is the
impact on the school itself.1 42 This is when the court could
conduct an analysis of whether there was a "substantial and
material" disruption. In determining whether there was a
sufficient disruption, the court should consider whether the
school
impairs
discipline by teachers and
statement
administrators.1 43 When properly satisfied, the "substantial
disruption" provision can strike a fair balance between protecting
a student's freedom of speech and allowing the school to make
justifiable decisions regarding the appropriateness of a student's
speech.144 The standard requires the existence of facts that
would "reasonably ... [lead] school authorities to forecast
nexus."); Bunger v. Iowa High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 197 N.W.2d 555, 559, 564 (Iowa
1972) (holding that the mere riding in a car that a student knew contained beer does
not have a sufficient nexus to the operation or discipline of the school).
140 See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
141

See id.

This factor is a combination of the substantial and material disruption test
and the Pickering balancing test. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)
(citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570-73 (1968)).
142

143

See id.

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509, 513-14
(1969) (holding that a school may censure speech that causes a substantial and
material disruption).
144
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substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities."'1 45 The only concession the court may allow for the
school is that the disruption could be reasonably foreseeable, as
opposed to having already occurred. 146 Whether it is reasonably
foreseeable should be based on a "well-founded expectation of
disruption," such as past incidents that arose out of similar
speech. 14 7 This concession is necessary because disruption is, in
substance, "what school discipline is designed to prevent."' 48 It is
important, however, to emphasize that "even reasonably
forecast[ed] disruption is not per se justification for prior
restraint or subsequent punishment."1 49 In other words, a school
is not authorized to censure student speech based merely on the
potential emotive impact that it may have on a listener. 5 0
D.

Unprotected Speech
There are certain times when a student's speech should not
be protected, regardless of where it originates or how it reached
campus. Primarily, the First Amendment does not provide for
the protection of "true threats."'15 "'True threats' encompass
those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
1 52
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals."'
145
146

Id. at 514.
See id.

147 Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2001).
148 Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 973 (5th Cir. 1972).
149 Id. The Supreme Court also addressed this concern in Tinker:
[U]ndifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute
regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion
may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the
campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an
argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take
this risk; and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedomthis kind of openness-that is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this
relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.
393 U.S. at 508-09 (citation omitted).
150 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (W.D. Pa. 2007)
(citing Saxe, 240 F.3d at 209).
151 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); see also RUSSO, supra note 50, at
§ 4.07[8] ("If students utter a true threat, ... the speech does not qualify for the
protection of the First Amendment." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
152Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708
(1969)). It is not necessary for the speaker to actually carry out the threat. Id. at
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The underlying concern for safety is particularly relevant in
courts today, especially in light of tragic events such as the
shootings at Columbine 53 and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University.15 4 The right of free speech is not guaranteed in
several other contexts, including speech that incites others to
imminent lawless action, 155 speech that consists of fighting
157
words, 156 and, finally, certain kinds of defamatory speech.
When speech falls into any of the above categories, student
speech analyses are inapplicable because the speech is
nevertheless unprotected, even in a non-school context. It is
more often true, however, that the student does have First
Amendment rights, the extent of which may be determined by
whether the speech originated on or off campus and how the
speech reached school grounds.
CONCLUSION
The right to speak one's mind and express ideas is a vital
and essential component of American society, whether applied to
an adult or a student. The Supreme Court has recognized that
the burning of an American flag is constitutionally protected free
359-60.

153 LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Given the
knowledge the shootings at Columbine ... have imparted about the potential for
school violence.., we must take care when evaluating a student's First Amendment
right of free expression against school officials' need to provide a safe school
environment not to overreact in favor of either."). See generally Doe v. Pulaski
County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002) (analyzing whether a letter
written by a student was a "true threat"); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d
367 (9th Cir. 1996) (analyzing whether a verbal statement made to a guidance
counselor was a "true threat"); Latour v. Riverside Beaver Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A. 051076, 2005 WL 2106562 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2005) (analyzing whether a rap song
written by a student was a "true threat").
154 See Helen Kennedy, Bullies Made School Hell for "Crucified"Va. Killer, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 20, 2007, at 19.
155 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[C]onstitutional guarantees
of free speech ... do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.").
156 Fighting words, which are "'those personally abusive epithets which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently
likely to provoke violent reaction[,]'" are generally condemnable under the First
Amendment. Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20
(1971)).
157 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 283 (1964) (allowing
for damages for defamation of a public official if the statement was made with
"actual malice").
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speech. 158 On any street corner people can openly and publicly
criticize political and religious leaders, and people can debate in
churches, synagogues, mosques, and through the media whether
homosexuality is a sin, whether same-sex marriage should be
constitutionally prohibited, or whether the war in Iraq should be
continued.
Students have First Amendment rights to discuss these
issues-though that right is a bit more circumscribed in a school
setting.
The school environment is a natural place where
students can be expected to raise controversial issues. It is also
natural to expect that such speech may be brought on campus by
another student.
One should expect to see an increase in the frequency of
these cases in the future because of the electronic communication
explosion, and because of the ever-present concern of school
violence. A uniform standard that balances all the circumstances
surrounding the speech is a solid first step towards ensuring that
student rights do not fall by the wayside.
To accomplish this objective, the test proposed in this Note
requires a balancing of interests; a test that is largely influenced
by public free speech cases. Pertinent considerations include:
(1) whether the student intended the speech to reach campus;
(2) whether the number of listeners was large or small;
(3) whether a nexus existed between the speech and school
operations; and (4) whether the speech disrupted school
operations. It is also recognized, however, that certain speechsuch as "true threats," speech that incites others to imminent
lawless action, "fighting words," and some defamatory speech-is
not protected, nor should it be in the future.

158 See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
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